Security

A fake chip can claim anything. It still can't sign like one.

If software could impersonate a security chip, one attacker could look like thousands of devices and everything else here would be theatre. It can't: no genuine manufacturer signature, no pass — whatever the device calls itself.

Which devices count

You choose the bar. We enforce the signature.

Some customers run in the cloud and want their own instances to count, so we label what kind of chip we're looking at and let your policy decide. The label is a convenience; the manufacturer signature is the defense, and it runs regardless of what the chip claims to be.

hardware

group

Discrete TPM chips soldered to motherboards. Highest assurance.

  • HardwareDiscreteInfineon

    Infineon OPTIGA RSA / ECC, IFX TPM EK Root CA

  • HardwareDiscreteStMicro

    STMicro ST TPM, GlobalSign Trusted Computing CA

  • HardwareDiscreteNuvoton

    NTC TPM EK Root CA, Nuvoton TPM Root CA 1xxx/2xxx

  • HardwareDiscreteOther

    Vendor unknown but chain validates against a pinned vendor root.

firmware-tpm

group

In-CPU TPMs. Cannot be swapped without replacing the CPU.

  • FirmwareTpmIntelPtt

    Intel Platform Trust Technology, ODCA-backed.

  • FirmwareTpmAmdFtpm

    AMD fTPM. Voltage-glitch risk on Zen 2/3 (faulTPM).

  • FirmwareTpmPluton

    Microsoft Pluton, post-2022 OEMs.

cloud-vtpm

group

Virtual TPMs running inside cloud hypervisors. Rejected by strict policy; cross-validated under cloud-permissive.

  • CloudVtpmAwsNitro

    AWS NitroTPM. Cross-validate via Nitro doc + EC2 IID.

  • CloudVtpmAzure

    Azure vTPM. Cross-validate via IMDS attested data + DigiCert G2.

  • CloudVtpmGcp

    GCP Shielded VM. Cross-validate via instance-identity JWT.

  • CloudVtpmHyperV

    Generic Hyper-V vTPM (non-Pluton 2014).

emulated

group

Software emulators. Always rejected outside dev policy.

  • EmulatedSwtpm

    Userspace swtpm. IBM manufacturer 0x49424D00. Chains to swtpm-localca.

mobile-hardware

group

Mobile devices with hardware-backed key attestation.

  • MobileAndroidStrongbox

    StrongBox secure element. attestationSecurityLevel = StrongBox.

  • MobileAndroidTee

    Android TEE-backed attestation.

  • MobileAppleSecureEnclave

    Apple Secure Enclave key attestation.

  • MobileAppleAppAttest

    DCAppAttestService. iOS App Attest.

mobile-software

group

Mobile attestation that didn't reach hardware-backing. Reduced assurance.

  • MobileAndroidSoftware

    Android attestationSecurityLevel = Software.

How the classifier actually works →manufacturer codes, issuer DNs, the swtpm case, cloud cross-validation

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